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ABSTRACT In this paper, we investigate the physical layer security in downlink of Power Domain
Non-Orthogonal Multiple Access (PD-NOMA)-based heterogeneous cellular network (HetNet). In this
paper, we assume two categories of users are available: 1) Trusted users and 2) untrusted users (eaves-
droppers) at which transparency of users is not clear for the BSs, i.e., they are potential eavesdroppers.
Our aim is to maximize the sum secrecy rate of the network. To this end, we formulate joint subcarrier
and power allocation optimization problems to increase sum secrecy rate. Moreover, we propose a novel
scheme at which the eavesdroppers are prevented from doing Successive Interference Cancellation (SIC),
while legitimate users are able to do it. In practical systems, perfectly availability of all eavesdroppers’
Channel State Information (CSI) at legitimate transmitters are impractical. Also CSIs of legitimate users
may be also imperfect due to the error of channel estimation. Hence, we study two cases of CSI availability:
1) Perfect CSI of nodes (legitimate users and eavesdroppers) are available at the BSs and 2) imperfect CSI
of nodes are available at the BSs. Since the proposed optimization problems are non-convex, we adopt the
well-known iterative algorithm called Alternative Search Method (ASM). In this algorithm, the optimization
problems are converted to two subproblems, power allocation and subcarrier allocation. We solve the power
allocation problem by the Successive Convex Approximation approach and solve the subcarrier allocation
subproblem, by exploiting the Mesh Adaptive Direct Search algorithm (MADS). Moreover, in order to study
the optimality gap of the proposed solutionmethod, we apply themonotonic optimizationmethod.Moreover,
we evaluate the proposed scheme for secure massive connectivity in Heterogeneous Ultra Dense Networks
(HUDNs). Furthermore, we investigate multiple antennas base stations scenario in this literature. Finally,
we numerically compare the proposed scheme with the conventional case at which the eavesdroppers are
able to apply SIC. Numerical results highlight that the proposed scheme significantly improves the sum
secrecy rate compared with the conventional case.
INDEX TERMS Physical layer security, PD-NOMA, resource allocation, monotonic optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. STATE OF THE ART AND MOTIVATION
The increasing demand of high data rates and multimedia
applications and scarcity of radio resources encourage oper-
ators, research centers, and vendors to devise new methods
and products for providing high data rate services for the
next-generation 5G network. International Telecommunica-
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Fangfei Li.
tion Union (ITU) has categorized 5G services into three
categories: 1) Ultra-reliable and low latency communica-
tion (URLLC), 2) enhanced mobile broadband (eMBB),
and 3) massive machine-type communication (mMTC) [1].
In mMTC, massive number of machine-type devices are con-
nected simultaneously. Services like sensing, monitoring, and
tagging which are in this category have two main challenges:
1) Scarcity of radio resources which make the deployment of
massive connections very difficult and 2) broadcast nature of
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wireless channels which make the massive connections inse-
cure. Massive connectivity is one the main features of future
wireless cellular networks which is suitable for IoT [2] and
machine-type communications (MTC) services. In massive
device connectivity scenarios, a cellular Base Station (BS)
connects to large number of devices (in order of 104 to 106 per
Km2). To achieve high throughput and spectrum efficiency,
Heterogeneous Ultra Dense Networks (HUDNs) is a promis-
ing solution at which the number of BSs per Km2 is very
large (about 40-50) [3]. In order to overcome the scarcity of
radio resources in this category, a newmultiple accessmethod
called power domain Non-Orthogonal Multiple Access (PD-
NOMA) can be adopted at which users are serviced within
a given resource slot (e.g., time/frequency) at different levels
of transmit power [4], [5]. In this method, users can remove
signals intended for other users which have the worse chan-
nel conditions, by employing successive interference can-
cellation (SIC) [6]–[8]. It is necessary to mention that SIC
concept was first proposed by Cover in 1972 [7] which is
very useful technique, because it imposes lower complexity
than joint decoding techniques [8]. It is worth noting that
the PD-NOMA technique has attracted significant attentions
in both academia and industry, [9]–[12]. It is necessary to
mention that it has been confirmed in theory domain [13] and
system-level simulations [14] which PD-NOMA surpasses
orthogonal frequency-division multiple access (OFDMA) in
different points of view such as device connections and spec-
trum efficiency. Based on these benefits, PD-NOMA is very
appropriate to be employed for meeting the 5G requirements
such as massive connectivity [15] which is very vital for
mMTC and Internet of Things (IoT). Besides, establishment
of security in these networks is a dilemma, because wireless
transmission has broadcast nature. Therefore, private infor-
mation that is exchanged between transmitter and receiver
is vulnerable of eavesdropping. During the past years, Phys-
ical Layer Security (PLS) as a promising idea, has been
widely investigated since Wyner presented his work in the
security domain [16]. Furthermore, as IoT is employed in
wide domains such as commercial, military, and govern-
mental application, security plays an important role in IoT
applications [17]. Due to constraints of energy consumption
and limited hard-ware in IoT devices, it is very vulnerable
with respect to eavesdropping. PLS owing to low computa-
tional complexity attracts a lot of attentions and is becoming
a suitable solution for secure communications in IoT [18].
B. RELATED WORKS
In recent years, PLS by employing PD-NOMA has been stud-
ied from various perspectives. The related works on this topic
can be categorized into two main categories, namely: 1) PLS
in PD-NOMA based system with single carrier, 2) PLS in
PD-NOMA based system with multiple carriers.
1) PLS IN PD-NOMA BASED SYSTEM WITH SINGLE CARRIER
PLS in PD-NOMA based systems with single carrier have
been recently studied from different perspectives in the
literature such as, maximizing the sum secrecy rate, study-
ing different transmit antenna selection strategies [19]–[24].
To be specific, PLS in single-input single-output (SISO)
systems based on the PD-NOMA technology is investi-
gated in [19], at which its objective is maximizing the
sum secrecy rate. Moreover, the authors in [20] derive a
closed-form expression for the secrecy outage probability in
MISO-NOMA system. Moreover, in [24], the authors study
PLS of PD-NOMA in large-scale networks with employ-
ing stochastic geometry, in which a new exact expression
of the outage secrecy rate is derived for single-antenna
and multiple-antenna cases. In these works because of sin-
gle carrier system models, the subcarrier allocation is not
considered.
2) PLS IN PD-NOMA BASED SYSTEM WITH
MULTIPLE CARRIERS
PLS in PD-NOMA based systems with multiple carriers have
been studied for different networks [25]–[27]. Specifically,
the authors in [25] study subcarrier and power allocation
in the two-way relay wireless network in the presence of
multiple preassigned user pairs, a jammer, and an eavesdrop-
per. Moreover, the authors in [26] consider a system model
consists of a full-duplex base station, multiple trusted uplink
and downlink users, and multiple untrusted users. The aim
of [26] is to address the resource allocation algorithm design
for the considered system model based on PD-NOMA.
Additionally, in [3], the authors study PD-NOMA-based
HUDNs for massive connectivity in 5G. The cost of
active user detection and channel estimation in massive
connectivity by employing massive MIMO are evaluated
in [28]. The authors in [29], propose an inter-cell interfer-
ence coordination mechanism in dense small cell networks.
Millimeter-Wave PD-NOMA in machine-to-machine (M2M)
communications for IoT networks is proposed in [30]. The
authors in [31] study dynamic user scheduling and power
allocation problem for massive IoT devices based PD-
NOMA.
It is worth noting that the aforementioned works do not
investigate PLS in PD-NOMA based HetNet and HUDNs.
Moreover, in these works, it is assumed that eavesdroppers
know the channel ordering and are able to perform SIC. Note
that eavesdroppers by doing SIC are able to decrease the sum
secrecy rate. Hence, to tackle this issue, we propose a novel
scheme such that, we do not allow the eavesdroppers to be
able to perform SIC, even if they know the channel ordering.
C. CONTRIBUTION
In the following, we summarize the main contributions of this
paper as:
• In this paper, we focus on this aspect of PD-NOMA,
‘‘how to avoid eavesdroppers from doing SIC and when
users are able to perform SIC?’’. From the information
theory point of view, user A can perform SIC when-
ever user B’s received Signal-to-Interference-plus-Noise
107880 VOLUME 7, 2019
M. Forouzesh et al.: Robust Physical Layer Security for PD-NOMA-Based HetNets and HUDNs: SIC Avoidance at Eavesdroppers
FIGURE 1. Secure transmission in downlink of PD-NOMA based HetNet.
Ratio (SINR) for its signal is less than or equal to user
A’s received SINR for user B’s signal [12], [32], [33].
To this end, we propose a novel resource allocation
algorithm such that, we do not allow eavesdroppers to
be able to perform SIC, even if they know the channel
ordering. In this regard, we formulate an optimization
problem at which we introduce a new constraint called
SIC avoidance at eavesdropper condition and the main
aim is to maximize the sum secrecy rate over transmit
power and subcarrier allocation variables.
• In practical systems, perfectly availability of all eaves-
droppers’ CSI at legitimate transmitters are impractical.
Also CSIs of legitimate users may be also imperfect
due to the error of channel estimation. Hence, we study
two cases of CSI availability, 1) Perfect CSI of nodes
(legitimate users and eavesdroppers) are available at the
BSs, 2) imperfect CSI of nodes are available at the BSs.
• In addition to the single antenna BSs scenario, we inves-
tigate themultiple antennas BSs scenario in the proposed
scheme.
• We evaluate the proposed scheme for secure massive
connectivity in 5G ultra dense networks. Without loss
of generality, for changing our scenario from Het-
Net to Heterogeneous Ultra Dense Networks (HUDN),
we need to extend the dimension of systemmodel. Since
the dimension of the optimization problem is very large,
proposing a low complex solution is very challenging.
To tackle this issue, a new method is proposed at which
we consider the uniform transmit power allocation.
Moreover, we show the performance of uniform power
allocation is close to the performance of our proposed
solution.
• We also apply the monotonic optimization method
to study the optimality gap of the proposed solution
method [34]. For this purpose, we convert the opti-
mization problems to the canonical form of mono-
tonic optimization problem and finally, by exploiting the
polyblock algorithm, we solve the monotonic optimiza-
tion problem, globally.
TABLE 1. List of the main variables.
D. ORGANIZATION
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
In Section II, we present system and signal model, respec-
tively, and explain our novel idea. Section III provides the
detailed problem formulation at two scenarios: 1) Perfect
CSI, 2) imperfect CSI. In Section IV, the proposed solu-
tion is expressed. The proposed scheme for ultra dense
network is evaluated in Section V. Our proposed optimal
solution is provided in Section VI. Multiple antennas BSs
scenario is investigated in Section VII. Performance evalua-
tion of the proposed resource allocation approach is discussed
in Section VIII, before ending, the paper is concluded in
Section IX.
II. SYSTEM AND SIGNAL MODEL
A. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, we focus on secure communication in the down-
link of PD-NOMA based HetNet. As illustrated in Fig. 1, our
system model consists of one MBS, and multiple SBSs. In
this paper, we assume two categories of users are available:
1) Trusted users, 2) untrusted users (eavesdroppers) at which
transparency of users is not clear for the BSs, i.e., they are
potential eavesdroppers. In this system model, we consider
two cases 1) Single antenna base station, 2) multiple antennas
base stations, assume that another nodes are equipped with
single antenna. For clarity, the main underutilized variables
in this paper are listed in Table 1. Note that f = 1 refers to
MBS. When BS f allocates subcarrier n to user m, the binary
variable ρfm,n ∈ {0, 1} is equal to one, i.e., ρfm,n = 1, and oth-
erwise, ρfm,n = 0. hfm,n = d−αm,f h˜fm,n is the channel coefficient
betweenBS f and userm on subcarrier n, where h˜fm,n indicates
the Rayleigh fading, α and dm,f are the path loss exponent
and the distance between user m and BS f , respectively.
Moreover, hfe,n = d−αe,f h˜fe,n. Note that the locations of BSs,
legitimate users and eavesdroppers are assumed to be mod-
eled as independent 2-D homogeneous Poisson Point Process
(PPP) [35]–[37]. As mentioned, we assume two categories
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of users are available: 1) Trusted users, 2) untrusted users at
which transparency of users is not clear for the BSs, i.e., they
are potential eavesdroppers. Hence, in this paper, we assume
the location of untrusted users (eavesdroppers) are perfectly
known at the BSs. However, if the location of untrusted
users are imperfectly known at the BSs, this scenario leads
to the imperfect CSI scenario which we investigate it in
Section III-B in detail.
B. SIGNAL MODEL
Employing the PD-NOMA technique, a linear combination
of Mf signals is diffused by BS f to its users, [38]. In other
words, BS f transmits
Mf∑
j=1
ρ
f
j,n
√
pfj,ns
f
j,n on subcarrier n, where
sfj,n denotes the transmitted symbol of the j
th user on the nth
subcarrier by BS f . Without loss of generality, it is assumed
E
{∣∣∣sfm,n∣∣∣2} = 1,∀m ∈ Mf , f ∈ F , n ∈ N , where Mf ,
N , and F are denoted set of all users in BS, set of total
subcarriers, and set of BSs, respectively. Moreover, E {x} is
the expectation of x. The received signals on the mth user and
the eth adversary, that are located in the coverage region of
BS f , on the nth subcarrier are expressed as
yfm,n = hfm,n
∑
i∈Mf
ρ
f
i,n
√
pfi,ns
f
i,n + Z fm,n
+
∑
f ′∈F/f
hf ′m,n
∑
i∈Mf ′
ρ
f ′
i,n
√
pf ′i,ns
f ′
i,n (1)
and
yfe,n = hfe,n
∑
i∈Mf
ρ
f
i,n
√
pfi,ns
f
i,n + Z fe,n
+
∑
f ′∈F/f
hf ′e,n
∑
i∈Mf ′
ρ
f ′
i,n
√
pf ′i,ns
f ′
i,n, (2)
respectively, where Z fm,n ∼ CN
(
0, σ 2
)
and Z fe,n ∼
CN (0, σ 2) are the complex Additive White Gaussian
Noise (AWGN) with zero-mean and variance σ 2, on subcar-
rier n, over BS f , at user m and eavesdropper e, respectively.
C. ACHIEVABLE RATES AT THE LEGITIMATE USERS AND
THE EAVESDROPPERS
In order to decode signals, in the PD-NOMA-based system,
users apply SIC [14], [39]. In these systems, user m, firstly
detects the ith user’s message, then removes the detected
message from the received signal, in a consecutiveway.When
user m applies SIC, its SINR in BS f on subcarrier n can be
expressed as:
γ fm,n =
pfm,n
∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2 ∑∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2≤∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2
i∈Mf /{m}
pfi,nρ
f
i,n + I fm,n + σ 2
, (3)
where I fm,n = ∑
f ′∈F/f
∣∣∣hf ′m,n∣∣∣2 ∑
i∈Mf ′
ρ
f ′
i,np
f ′
i,n and its achievabil-
ity rate is given by:
r fm,n = log(1+ γ fm,n). (4)
In the PD-NOMA-based system, users are able to perform
SIC, if the following condition holds [12], [32], [33]
• SIC can be applied by user m if user i’s received SINR
for its signal is less than or equal to user m’s received
SINR for user i’s signal.
In other words, user m can successfully decode and remove
the ith user’s signal on subcarrier n in BS f , whenever the
following inequality is satisfied:
γ fm,n (i) ≥ γ fi,n (i)∀i, m ∈Mf , f ∈ F , n ∈ N ,
|hfi,n|2 ≤ |hfm,n|2, i 6= m, (5)
where γ fm,n (i) is user m’s SINR for user i’s signal and γ
f
i,n (i)
is user i’s SINR for its own signal. Accordingly, (5) can be
rewritten as follows:
Qfm,i,n(ρ,P)
, −|hfm,n|2σ 2 + |hfi,n|2σ 2 + |hfi,n|2I fm,n
− |hfm,n|2I fi,n −
∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2 ∑∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2≤∣∣∣hfl,n∣∣∣2
l∈Mf /{i}
pfl,nρ
f
l,n
+
∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2 ∑∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2≤∣∣∣hfl,n∣∣∣2
l∈Mf /{i}
pfl,nρ
f
l,n ≤ 0. (6)
We propose a novel resource allocation algorithm in which
eavesdropper is not able to employ SIC to increase its own
achievable rate. In this case, eavesdropper e can not apply
SIC, hence, all users’ messages are treated as interference in
the eth eavesdropper. Therefore, SINR of the eavesdropper e
in BS f on subcarrier n can be obtained as:
γ f ,me,n =
pfm,n
∣∣∣hfe,n∣∣∣2∣∣∣hfe,n∣∣∣2 ∑
i∈Mf /{m}
pfi,nρ
f
i,n + I fe,n + σ 2
. (7)
where I fe,n = ∑
f ′∈F/f
∣∣∣hf ′e,n∣∣∣2 ∑
i∈Mf ′
ρ
f ′
i,np
f ′
i,n and its achievable
rate is given by:
r f ,me,n = log(1+ γ f ,me,n ), (8)
For SIC avoidance at the eavesdroppers, the following
inequality must be satisfied:
γ f ,me,n (i) ≤ γ fi,n (i) ,∀i,m ∈Mf , e ∈ E, f ∈ F , n ∈ N
|hfi,n|2 ≤ |hfe,n|2, (9)
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by some mathematical manipulation, (9) is equivalent to the
following inequality1:
9
f
m,i,n,e(ρ,P)
= −|hfe,n|2σ 2 + |hfi,n|2σ 2 − |hfe,n|2I fi,n
+ |hfi,n|2I fe,n −
∣∣∣hfe,n∣∣∣2∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2 ∑∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2≤∣∣∣hfl,n∣∣∣2
l∈Mf /{i}
pfl,nρ
f
l,n
+
∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2∣∣∣hfe,n∣∣∣2 ∑
l∈Mf /{i}
pfl,nρ
f
l,n ≥ 0. (10)
In the following, we assume that the eavesdroppers are non-
colluding, hence we have
r f ,memax,n = maxe∈E
{
log(1+ γ f ,me,n )
}
, (11)
therefore, the secrecy rare at the mth user served by BS f on
subcarrier n can be obtained as follows:
Rsec fm,n =
[
r fm,n − r f ,memax,n
]+
, (12)
where [9]+ = max {9, 0}.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we propose a new policy for resource alloca-
tion to maximize the sum secrecy rate. It should be noted,
in practical systems, having knowledge of all eavesdrop-
pers’ CSI is very important, hence, we investigate two cases:
1) Perfect CSI of the eavesdroppers, 2) imperfect CSI of
the eavesdroppers, We investigate these two scenarios in two
Subsections III-A and III-B, respectively.
A. PERFECT CSI SCENARIO
In this subsection, we assume the CSI of eavesdroppers are
available at the BSs [40], [41].Moreover, we propose a policy
for resource allocation to maximize the sum secrecy rate.
In this policy, unlike the users, the eavesdroppers cannot
apply SIC. We formulate the considered optimization prob-
lem of sum secrecy rate maximization as (13). Since the
secrecy rate cannot be negative, constraint (14) should be
satisfied.
max
P,ρ
∑
∀f ∈F
∑
∀m∈Mf
∑
∀n∈N
ρfm,n
{
r fm,n − r f ,memax,n
}
,
(13a)
s.t. : C1 :
∑
m∈Mf
∑
n∈N
ρfm,np
f
m,n ≤ pfmax ∀f ∈ F ,
(13b)
1It is worth noting that in the multi BSs networks because of having
inter-cellular interference, if eavesdropper’s channel is superior to user m,
the eavesdropper’s received SINR for user m’s signal is not necessarily
more than user m’s received SINR at its own signal. The reason is that if
eavesdropper’s channel is superior to user m, it is possible that eavesdropper
receivesmore interference from other BSswith respect to userm, which leads
to a decrease in the eavesdropper’s received SINR for user m’s signal.
C2 :
∑
m∈Mf
ρfm,n ≤ `, ∀n ∈ N , f ∈ F , (13c)
C3 : ρfm,n ∈
{
0, 1
}
, ∀m ∈Mf , n ∈ N , f ∈ F ,
(13d)
C4 : pfm,n ≥ 0, ∀m ∈Mf , n ∈ N , f ∈ F ,
(13e)
C5 : ρfm,nρfi,nQfm,i,n(ρ, P)≤0, ∀f ∈F ,
n∈N , m, i∈Mf , |hfi,n|2 ≤ |hfm,n|2, i 6= m,
(13f)
C6 : ρfm,nρfi,nψ fm,i,n,e(ρ,P) ≥ 0, ∀f ∈ F , n∈N ,
m, i ∈Mf , e ∈ E, |hfi,n|2 ≤ |hfe,n|2,
(13g)
C7 : r fm,n−r f ,memax,n≥0, ∀m∈Mf , n∈N , f ∈F ,
(13h)
The optimization variables P and ρ are defined as P =[
pfm,n
]
and ρ =
[
ρ
f
m,n
]
∀m ∈ Mf , n ∈ N , f ∈ F ,
moreover pfmax is the maximum allowable transmit power at
BS f . Constraint C1 demonstrates the maximum allowable
transmit power of BS f . In order to guarantee each subcar-
rier can be allocated to at most ` users, constraint C2 is
imposed. Constraint C4 denotes that the transmit power is
non-negative. Constraint C5 guarantees user m can perform
SIC successfully on users that |hfi,n|2 ≤ |hfm,n|2. Constraint
C6 assures that eavesdropper e is not able to perform SIC,
and other users’ signals are treated as interference. Constraint
C7 imposes that the secrecy rate is not never negative. It is
necessary tomention that constraintsC5 andC6 are consistent
under all circumstances. In order to investigate this claim,
we consider the worst circumstance in which γ f ,me,n (i) >
γ
f
i,n (i) ,∀i,m ∈Mf , e ∈ E, f ∈ F , n ∈ N , |hfi,n|2 ≤ |hfe,n|2.
In this considered case, the mentioned BS f does not allocate
subcarrier n to userm, i.e., ρfm,n = 0, which leads to satisfying
constraints C5 and C6.
B. IMPERFECT CSI SCENARIO
In this subsection, we assume imperfect CSI of nodes is
available at the BSs.2 In other words, the BSs have the knowl-
edge of an estimated version of channel [42], [43], i.e., hˆfe,n
and hˆfm,n, and the channel estimation errors at eavesdroppers
and users are defined as ehfe,n = h˜
f
e,n − hˆfe,n and ehfm,n =
h˜fm,n − hˆfm,n, respectively. Based on the worst case method,
2Asmentioned, we assume two categories of users are available 1) Trusted
users, 2) untrusted users at which transparency of users is not clear for the
BSs, i.e., they are potential eavesdroppers. If the untrusted users similar to
the trusted users transmit pilot signals, the BSs estimate the channels, this
case leads to ‘‘perfect CSI scenario’’. But if the untrusted users transmit
the degraded or reinforced versions of pilot signals, the BSs are not able
to estimate CSI of the untrusted users perfectly which leads to ‘‘imperfect
CSI scenario’’ i.e., the BSs can have the knowledge of an estimated version
of each eavesdropping channel. Moreover, in practical systems, CSIs of
legitimate users may be also imperfect due to the error of channel estimation.
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the channel mismatches lie in the bounded set, i.e., Ehe ={
ehfe,n :
∣∣∣ehfe,n ∣∣∣2 ≤ e
}
∀e ∈ E, n ∈ N , f ∈ F , and Ehm ={
ehfm,n :
∣∣∣ehfm,n ∣∣∣2 ≤ m
}
∀m ∈Mf , n ∈ N , f ∈ F , where e
and m are known constant. Therefore, we model the channel
coefficients fromBS f to the eth and themth user on subcarrier
n as follows, respectively:∣∣∣h˜fe,n∣∣∣2 = ∣∣∣hˆfe,n + ehfe,n ∣∣∣2, ∣∣∣h˜fm,n∣∣∣2 = ∣∣∣hˆfm,n + ehfm,n ∣∣∣2. (14)
We focus on optimizing the worst-case performance, where
we maximize the worst case sum secrecy rate for the worst
channel mismatch ehfe,n and ehfm,n in the bounded set Ehe and
Ehm . Hence, the imperfect CSI optimization problem can be
formulated as follows:
max
P,ρ
min
εe,εm
∑
∀f ∈F
∑
∀m∈Mf
∑
∀n∈N
ρfm,n
{
r fm,n − r f ,memax,n
}
,
(15a)
s.t. : C1 :
∑
m∈Mf
∑
n∈N
ρfm,np
f
m,n ≤ pfmax ∀f ∈ F ,
(15b)
C2 :
∑
m∈Mf
ρfm,n ≤ `, ∀n ∈ N , f ∈ F ,
(15c)
C3 : ρfm,n ∈
{
0, 1
}
, ∀m ∈Mf , n ∈ N , f ∈ F ,
(15d)
C4 : pfm,n ≥ 0, ∀m ∈Mf , n ∈ N , f ∈ F ,
(15e)
C5 : ρfm,nρfi,nQfm,i,n(ρ,P) ≤ 0, ∀f ∈ F ,
n ∈ N ,m, i ∈Mf , |hfi,n|2 ≤ |hfm,n|2, i 6= m,
(15f)
C6 : ρfm,nρfi,nψ fm,i,n,e(ρ,P)≥0, ∀f ∈F , n∈N ,
m, i ∈Mf , e ∈ E, |hfi,n|2 ≤ |hfe,n|2, i 6= m,
(15g)
C7 : r fm,n−r f ,memax,n≥0, ∀m∈Mf , n∈N , f ∈F ,
(15h)
C8 :
∣∣∣ehfe,n ∣∣∣2 ≤ e, ∀f ∈ F , n ∈ N , e ∈ E,
(15i)
C9 :
∣∣∣ehfm,n ∣∣∣2 ≤ m,∀f ∈ F , n ∈ N , m ∈Mf ,
(15j)
where the optimization variables εe and εm are defined as
εe =
[
ehfe,n
]
,∀e ∈ E, n ∈ N , f ∈ F and εm =[
ehfm,n
]
,∀m ∈Mf , n ∈ N , f ∈ F , respectively.
IV. SOLUTIONS OF THE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
The optimization problems (13) and (15) are non-convex
because they have binary and continuous variables for subcar-
rier and power allocation, respectively. Besides, the objective
functions are non-convex. Hence, we can not employ exist-
ing convex optimization methods straightly. Hence, to tackle
this issue, we adopt the well-known alternative method [44],
to solve the optimization problems.3
A. SOLUTION OF THE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM IN
PERFECT CSI SCENARIO
As there is the max operator in the objective function and
Constraint C7, we use a slack variable υ
f
m,n which is defined
as
max
e∈εe
{
log(1+ γ f ,me,n )
}
= υ fm,n, (16)
by applying the epigraph method, the optimization problem
(13) is rewritten as
max
P,ρ,υ
∑
∀f ∈F
∑
∀m∈Mf
∑
∀n∈N
ρfm,n
{
r fm,n − υ fm,n
}
,
(17a)
s.t. : C1 − C6,
C ′7 :
{
r fm,n−υ fm,n
}
≥0, ∀m∈Mf , n∈N , f ∈F ,
(17b)
C ′8 : log
(
1+ γ f ,me,n
)
≤ υ fm,n ∀e ∈ E, n ∈ N ,
f ∈ F , ∀m ∈Mf ,
(17c)
where υ is defined as υ =
[
υ
f
m,n
]
,∀m ∈ Mf , n ∈
N , f ∈ F . For solving (17), we adopt the well-known
iterative algorithm called ASM. In this method, the opti-
mization problems are converted to two subproblems which
one of them has binary and another has continuous opti-
mization variables, in other words, power and subcarrier are
allocated alternatively [45]. In this method, in each itera-
tion, we allocate transmit power and subcarriers, separately.
In other words, in this iterative method, in each iteration
we consider fixed subcarrier and allocate power, then, for
subcarrier allocation we consider fixed power.We summarize
the explained algorithm in Algorithm 1. As seen in this
algorithm, it is ended when the stopping condition is satisfied
i.e., ‖P (µ+ 1)− P (µ)‖ ≤ 2, where µ and 2 are the
iteration number and stopping threshold, respectively.
1) INITIALIZATION METHOD
In order to begin the algorithm, we need to initial vectors
P and ρ. For initialization, it is supposed that the SBSs do
not transmit data, i.e., SBSs at initialization do not serve any
users [46], [47]. In other words, pfm,n = 0 ∀f ∈ F/{0}.
Moreover, the subcarriers are allocated to one MBS user that
has the highest secrecy rate.
3Please note that our aim is to design a strategy to prevent eavesdroppers
from using SIC. Hence, we employ the well-known method and approxima-
tion to solve our proposed optimization problem. It is worth noting that we
compare the output of employed methods with the optimal solution which is
obtained by the high complex polyblock algorithm, however, the employed
method is low complex and its optimality gap is small.
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Algorithm 1 Iterative Resource Allocation Algorithm for
Perfect CSI
1: Reformulate the optimization problem via the epigraph
method
2: Initialization: Set µ = 0 (µ is the iteration number) and
initialize to ρ(0) and P(0).
3: Set ρ = ρ (µ),
4: Solve (43) and set the result to P (µ+ 1),
5: Solve (18) and set the result to ρ (µ+ 1),
6: If ‖P (µ+ 1)− P (µ)‖ ≤ 2
stop,
else
set µ = µ+ 1 and go back to step 3.
2) SUBCARRIER ALLOCATION
The subproblem for subcarrier allocation with fixed trans-
mit power (which are computed in the previous iteration) is
expressed as:
max
ρ
∑
∀f ∈F
∑
∀m∈Mf
∑
∀n∈N
ρfm,n
{
r fm,n − υ fm,n
}
,
s.t. : C1 − C3,C5,C6,C ′7,C ′8. (18)
Since this optimization problem is Integer Nonlinear Pro-
gramming (INLP), we can solve it by exploiting MADS,
to this end, we employ the NOMAD solver [48].
3) POWER ALLOCATION
The power allocation subproblem at each iteration when
the subcarriers allocation variables are fixed, is expressed as
max
P,υ
∑
∀f ∈F
∑
∀m∈Mf
∑
∀n∈N
ρfm,n
{
r fm,n − υ fm,n
}
,
s.t. : C1,C4 − C6,C ′7,C ′8. (19)
This optimization subproblem is non-convex because con-
straintC ′8 is non-convex, the objective function and constraint
C ′7 are non-concave. To tackle this difficulty, we utilize the
SCA approach to approximate constraints C ′8 and the objec-
tive function.
First, we investigate C ′8:
C ′8 : log
(
1+ γ f ,me,n
)
≤ υ fm,n, (20)
by substitution (7) into (20), we have
log
1+ p
f
m,n
∣∣∣hfe,n∣∣∣2∣∣∣hfe,n∣∣∣2 ∑
i∈Mf /{m}
pfi,nρ
f
i,n + I fe,n + σ 2
−υ fm,n≤0,
(21)
the left hand side of (21) is written as follows:
log
∣∣∣hfe,n∣∣∣2 ∑
i∈Mf /{m}
pfi,nρ
f
i,n + I fe,n + σ 2 + pfm,n
∣∣∣hfe,n∣∣∣2

− log
∣∣∣hfe,n∣∣∣2 ∑
i∈Mf /{m}
pfi,nρ
f
i,n + I fe,n + σ 2
− υ fm,n.
(22)
As seen, (22) is the difference between two concave func-
tions. Hence, we can employ the DC method to approximate
(22) to a convex constraint. To this end, we write (22) as
follows:
4f ,me,n (P) = =f ,me,n (P)−8f ,me,n (P), (23)
where
=f ,me,n (P)
= − log
∣∣∣hfe,n∣∣∣2 ∑
i∈Mf /{m}
pfi,nρ
f
i,n + I fe,n + σ 2
− υ fm,n,
(24)
and
8f ,me,n (P)
=− log
∣∣∣hfe,n∣∣∣2 ∑
i∈Mf /{m}
pfi,nρ
f
i,n+pfm,n
∣∣∣hfe,n∣∣∣2+I fe,n+σ 2

(25)
=f ,me,n (P) and 8f ,me,n (P) are convex, by utilizing a linear
approximation, 8f ,me,n (P) can be written as follows:
8f ,me,n (P) ' 8˜f ,me,n (P) = 8f ,me,n (P (µ− 1))
+ ∇T8f ,me,n (P (µ− 1)) (P− P(µ− 1)),
where∇8f ,me,n (P), is the gradient of8f ,me,n (P)which is defined
as:
∇8f ,me,n (P) =
∂
∂P
8f ,me,n (P)
=
[
∂8
f ,m
e,n (P)
∂pfm,n
]
, ∀m ∈Mf , ∀n ∈ N ,
∀f ∈ F , ∀e ∈ E, (26)
and
∂8
f ,m
e,n (P)
∂pca,b
=

X , a = m, b = n, c = f ,
Y , ∀a ∈Mf / {m} , b = n, c = f ,
B, ∀a ∈Mf ′ , b = n, c = f ′ ∈ F/f ,
0, O.W ,
(27)
moreover, X , Y , and B are calculated as follows:
X = −
∣∣∣hfe,n∣∣∣2∣∣∣hfe,n∣∣∣2 ∑
i∈Mf /{m}
pfi,nρ
f
i,n + pfm,n
∣∣∣hfe,n∣∣∣2 + I fe,n + σ 2 ,
(28)
VOLUME 7, 2019 107885
M. Forouzesh et al.: Robust Physical Layer Security for PD-NOMA-Based HetNets and HUDNs: SIC Avoidance at Eavesdroppers
Y = −
∣∣∣hfe,n∣∣∣2ρfa,n∣∣∣hfe,n∣∣∣2 ∑
i∈Mf /{m}
pfi,nρ
f
i,n + pfm,n
∣∣∣hfe,n∣∣∣2 + I fe,n + σ 2 ,
(29)
B = −
∣∣hce,n∣∣2ρca,n∣∣∣hfe,n∣∣∣2 ∑
i∈Mf /{m}
pfi,nρ
f
i,n + pfm,n
∣∣∣hfe,n∣∣∣2 + I fe,n + σ 2 ,
(30)
therefore,∇T8f ,me,n (P) is a vector that its length isN×M×F .
After approximation C ′8 to the convex constraint, we convert
the objective function and constraintC ′7 to a concave function
and concave constrain, respectively, by exploiting the DC
method, hence we have:
log(1+ γ fm,n)− υ fm,n, (31)
by substitution (3) into (31), we have
log(1+
pfm,n
∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2 ∑∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2≤∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2
i∈Mf /{m}
pfi,nρ
f
i,n + I fm,n + σ 2
)− υ fm,n,
(32)
where can be written as:
log(
∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2 ∑∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2≤∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2
i∈Mf /{m}
pfi,nρ
f
i,n + I fm,n + σ 2
+ pfm,n
∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2)− log(∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2 ∑∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2≤∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2
i∈Mf /{m}
pfi,nρ
f
i,n + I fm,n
+ σ 2)− υ fm,n, (33)
we can writhe (33) as follows:
U fm,n (P)= Gfm,n (P)−H fm,n (P), (34)
where H fm,n (P) and G
f
m,n (P) are defined as
Gfm,n (P) = −υ fm,n + log (35)
× (
∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2 ∑∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2≤∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2
i∈Mf /{m}
pfi,nρ
f
i,n + pfm,n
∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2
+ I fm,n + σ 2), (36)
and
H fm,n (P)
= log

∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2 ∑∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2≤∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2
i∈Mf /{m}
pfi,nρ
f
i,n + I fm,n + σ 2
, (37)
respectively. Gfm,n (P) and H
f
m,n (P) are concave, by utilizing
a linear approximation we can write H fm,n (P) as follows:
H fm,n (P) ' H˜ fm,n (P) = H fm,n (P (µ− 1))
+∇TH fm,n (P (µ− 1)) (P− P(µ− 1)), (38)
where ∇TH fm,n (P) is calculated as follows:
∇TH fm,n (P) =
∂
∂P
H fm,n (P)
=
[
∂H fm,n (P)
∂pfm,n
]
, ∀m ∈Mf , ∀n ∈ N ,
∀f ∈ F , (39)
We take derivative ofH fm,n (P)with respect to pca,b as follows:
∂H fm,n (P)
∂pca,b
=

Z ∀a ∈Mf / {m} , b = n, c = f ,
∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2 ≤ ∣∣∣hfa,n∣∣∣2,
T ∀a ∈Mf ′ , b = n, c = f ′ ∈ F/f
0 O.W
(40)
where Z and T are calculated as follows:
Z =
∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2ρfa,n∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2 ∑∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2≤∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2
i∈Mf /{m}
pfi,nρ
f
i,n + I fm,n + σ 2
, (41)
T =
∣∣hcm,n∣∣2ρca,n∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2 ∑∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2≤∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2
i∈Mf /{m}
pfi,nρ
f
i,n + I fm,n + σ 2
. (42)
Consequently, we have a convex optimization problem in the
canonical form, by exploiting the DC approximation, which
is formulated as:
max
P,υ
∑
∀f ∈F
∑
∀m∈Mf
∑
∀n∈N
ρfm,n
{
Gfm,n (P)− H˜ fm,n (P)
}
,
(43a)
s.t. : C1 − C6, (43b)
C ′7 : Gfm,n (P)− H˜ fm,n (P) ≥ 0, ∀m ∈Mf ,
(43c)
n ∈ N , f ∈ F ,
C ′8 : =f ,me,n (P)− 8˜f ,me,n (P) ≤ 0 ∀e ∈ E, (43d)
n ∈ N , f ∈ F ,m ∈Mf ,
For solving the convex optimization problem (43), we can use
available softwares, such as CVX solver [49].
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4) CONVERGENCE OF THE ALGORITHM
In this subsection, we prove the convergence of the algorithm
and illustrate that after each iteration the value of objective
function f (ρ,P) = ρfm,n
{
r fm,n − υ f ,me,n
}
, is improved and
converged.
Proof: In this algorithm, after applying the third step,
with a given ρ = ρ (µ), the power allocation of iteration
µ + 1 is obtained. According to Appendix I, we will have
f (ρ (µ) ,P (µ)) ≤ f (ρ (µ) ,P (µ+ 1) ). Moreover, in the
fourth step, with a given P = P (µ+ 1), the subcarrier
allocation of this iteration is obtained. According to this fact
that, after each iteration, subcarrier allocation with feasible
power solution improves the objective function, hence we
have:
. . . ≤ f (ρ (µ) ,P (µ)) ≤ f (ρ (µ) ,P (µ+ 1))
≤ f (ρ (µ+ 1) ,P (µ+ 1))
≤ . . . ≤ f (ρ∗,P∗) (44)
where ρ∗ and P∗ are obtained at the last iteration, [50].
Convergence behavior of the proposed algorithm is shown
in Fig. 6. It should be noted, globally optimal solution is not
guaranteed by this solution even after convergence. Hence,
for finding the globally optimal solution, we utilize themono-
tonic optimization method which is explained, in Section VI.
5) COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY
Solution of the optimization problem (13) consists of two
stages 1) Calculation of power allocation from problem (43),
2) calculation of subcarrier allocation from problem (18).
As we know, CVX software employs geometric programing
with the Interior Point Method (IPM) [49], hence, the order
of computational complexity can be obtained as:
O
(
log
(NOC
t∂
)
log (ξ)
)
, (45)
where NOC is the total number of constraints. ∂ , ξ and t are
parameters of IPM. 0 ≤ ∂ << 1 is the stopping criterion
of IPM, ξ is used for the accuracy IPM and t is initial point
for approximated the accuracy of IPM, [46], [51]. Hence,
the complexity order is given by:
O
 log
(
F(1+N (1+M+M(M−1)+ME(M−1)+ME))
t∂
)
log (ξ)
 (46)
B. SOLUTION OF THE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM IN
IMPERFECT CSI SCENARIO
For solving (15), first we solve the inner minimization and
obtain εe and εm, then solve the maximization problem
according to Section IV-A. The inner minimization can be
written as follows:
min
εe,εm
∑
∀f ∈F
∑
∀m∈Mf
∑
∀n∈N
ρfm,n
{
r fm,n − υ fm,n
}
, (47a)
s.t. : C5,C6,C8,C9,C ′7,C ′8. (47b)
Our aim is to minimize the objective function, to this end,
we should maximize υ fm,n and minimize r
f
m,n. Hence, in order
tomaximize υ fm,n, according toC ′8, wemaximize lower bound
of υ fm,n, i.e., log
(
1+ γ f ,me,n
)
. Since the logarithmic function is
increasing, we can maximize γ f ,me,n instead of log
(
1+ γ f ,me,n
)
.
As γ f ,me,n is fractional, we should maximize the numerator and
minimize the denominator. To this end, we use the triangle
inequality which is defined as follows:∣∣∣hˆfe,n∣∣∣2 − e ≤ ∣∣∣hˆfe,n∣∣∣2 − ∣∣∣ehfe,n ∣∣∣2 ≤ ∣∣∣hˆfe,n + ehfe,n ∣∣∣2
≤
∣∣∣hˆfe,n∣∣∣2 + ∣∣∣ehfe,n ∣∣∣2 ≤ ∣∣∣hˆfe,n∣∣∣2 + e. (48)
By using (48), we can write the upper bound of γ f ,me,n as
follows:
γ fe,n =
pfm,n
∣∣∣hfe,n∣∣∣2∣∣∣hfe,n∣∣∣2 ∑
i∈Mf /{m}
pfi,nρ
f
i,n + I fe,n + σ 2
≤ γ˜ fe,n
=
pfm,n
(∣∣∣hˆfe,n∣∣∣2 + e)(∣∣∣hˆfe,n∣∣∣2 − e) ∑
i∈Mf /{m}
pfi,nρ
f
i,n + I˜ fe,n + σ 2
. (49)
where I˜ fe,n = ∑
f ′∈F/f
(∣∣∣hˆf ′e,n∣∣∣2 − e) ∑
i∈Mf ′
ρ
f ′
i,np
f ′
i,n. Also,
we consider the worst case for constraint C6. According to
(48), we can rewrite the worst case C6 as follows:
9
f
m,i,n,e(ρ,P)
≥ 9˜ fm,i,n,e(ρ,P) =
(∣∣∣hˆfi,n∣∣∣2 − m) σ 2
+
(∣∣∣hˆfi,n∣∣∣2 − m) I˜ fe,n − (∣∣∣hˆfe,n∣∣∣2 + e)
×

(∣∣∣hˆfi,n∣∣∣2+m) ∑∣∣∣hˆfi,n∣∣∣2−m≤∣∣∣hˆfl,n∣∣∣2+m
l∈Mf /{i}
pfl,nρ
f
l,n+ I˜ fi,n+σ 2

+
(∣∣∣hˆfe,n∣∣∣2 − e)(∣∣∣hˆfi,n∣∣∣2 − m) ∑
l∈Mf /{i}
pfl,nρ
f
l,n ≥ 0.
(50)
Moreover, in order to minimize r fm,n, we minimize γ
f
m,n.
As γ f ,mm,n is fractional, we should minimize the numerator
and maximize the denominator. To this end, we employ the
triangle inequality as follows:
γ fm,n=
pfm,n
∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2 ∑∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2≤∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2
i∈Mf /{m}
pfi,nρ
f
i,n + I fm,n + σ 2
≥ γ˜ fm,n
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=
pfm,n(
∣∣∣hˆfm,n∣∣∣2−m)
(
∣∣∣hˆfm,n∣∣∣2+m) ∑∣∣∣hˆfm,n∣∣∣2−m≤∣∣∣hˆfi,n∣∣∣2+m
i∈Mf /{m}
pfi,nρ
f
i,n+ I˜ fm,n+σ 2
,
(51)
where I˜ fm,n = ∑
f ′∈F/f
(∣∣∣hˆfm,n∣∣∣2 + m) ∑
i∈Mf ′
ρ
f ′
i,np
f ′
i,n. Also,
we consider the worst case for constraint C5. Therefore,
we can rewrite the worst case C5 as follows:
Qfm,i,n(ρ,P)
≤ Q˜fm,i,n(ρ,P) = −
(∣∣∣hˆfm,n∣∣∣2 − m) σ 2
+
(∣∣∣hˆfi,n∣∣∣2 + m) σ 2 + (∣∣∣hˆfi,n∣∣∣2 + m) I˜ fm,n
−
(∣∣∣hˆfm,n∣∣∣2 − m) I˜ fi,n − (∣∣∣hˆfi,n∣∣∣2 − m)
×
(∣∣∣hˆfm,n∣∣∣2 − m)∑∣∣∣hˆfi,n∣∣∣2+m≤∣∣∣hˆfl,n∣∣∣2−m
l∈Mf /{i}
pfl,nρ
f
l,n +
(∣∣∣hˆfm,n∣∣∣2 + m)
×
(∣∣∣hˆfi,n∣∣∣2 + m) ∑∣∣∣hˆfm,n∣∣∣2−m≤∣∣∣hˆfl,n∣∣∣2+m
l∈Mf /{i}
pfl,nρ
f
l,n ≤ 0. (52)
In the following, we should solve the outer maximization,
which is written as follows:
max
P,ρ,υ
∑
∀f ∈F
∑
∀m∈Mf
∑
∀n∈N
ρfm,n
{
r˜ fm,n − υ fm,n
}
, (53a)
s.t. : C1 − C4 (53b)
C ′5 : ρfm,nρfi,nQ˜fm,i,n(ρ, P) ≤ 0, ∀f ∈ F ,
n ∈ N ,m, i ∈Mf , |hfi,n|2 ≤ |hfm,n|2, i 6= m,
(53c)
C ′6 : ρfm,nρfi,nψ˜ fm,i,n,e(ρ,P)≥0, ∀f ∈F , n∈N ,
m, i ∈Mf , e ∈ E, |hfi,n|2 ≤ |hfe,n|2, i 6= m,
(53d)
C ′′7 :
{˜
r fm,n−υ fm,n
}
≥0, ∀m∈Mf , n∈N , f ∈ F ,
(53e)
C ′′8 : log
(
1+ γ˜ f ,me,n
)
≤ υ fm,n ∀e ∈ E, n ∈ N ,
f ∈ F , ∀m ∈Mf , (53f)
The optimization problem (53) can be solved similar to the
proposed approach in Section IV-A.
V. MASSIVE CONNECTIVITY SCENARIO
In this section, we aim to evaluate the PD-NOMA tech-
nique in ultra dense network for secure massive connectivity
in 5G networks. Without loss of generality, for changing
our scenario from HetNet to HUDN, we need to extend the
dimension of system model. According to [3], [29], and [52],
in order to tackle high dimension complexity of resource
allocation in HUDNs and overcome hardware computation
limitations, it is assumed that the transmit power is uniformly
allocated to devices/users and subcarriers are dynamically
allocated.
To know the performance degradation due to the uniform
power allocation, we compare the uniform power allocation
method for a small network dimension with our proposed
solution i.e., joint power and subcarrier allocation in section
of simulation result. Based on simulation results, we show
the performance of uniform power allocation is close to the
performance of our proposed solution i.e., joint power and
subcarrier allocation in the small network dimension.
VI. OPTIMAL SOLUTION
In this section, our aim is to find optimal solution for the
optimization problem (17) by utilizing the monotonic opti-
mization method.
Note that, a monotonic optimization problem in the canon-
ical form is formulated as:
max
x
g(x)
s.t. x ∈ ϒ1 ∩ ϒ2, (54)
where g(x) is an increasing function, ϒ1 is a normal set
with non-empty interior, and ϒ2 is a co-normal set. Hence,
the optimization problem (17) is not in this form, because
of existence of binary variables and non increasing objective
function. Hence, three main steps should be performed as
follows:
1) Problem (17) is transformed into an optimization prob-
lem at which its optimization variables are only trans-
mit power.
2) The new optimization problem is converted to a canon-
ical form of monotonic optimization problem.
3) Finally, by exploiting the polyblock algorithm,
we solve the monotonic optimization problem globally.
A. PROBLEM TRANSFORMATION
For the first step, we transform (17) into an optimiza-
tion problem at which its optimization variables are
only transmit power. Based on constraints (13c) and
(14), if pfm,n = 0, . . . , and pfi,n = 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
`
, we have pfw,n =
0, ∀m, . . . , i,w ∈ Mf , m 6= i 6= w. Therefore, constraint
(13c) is equivalent to the following constraint
pfm,n × . . .× pfi,n × pfw,n︸ ︷︷ ︸
`+1
≤ 0, ∀n ∈ N , f ∈ F
m, . . . , i, w ∈ Mf , m 6= . . . 6= i 6= w.
(55)
Therefore, the optimization problem (17) can be transformed
into a new optimization problem with only transmit power
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variables as follows:
max
P,υ
∑
∀f ∈F
∑
∀m∈Mf
∑
∀n∈N
{
r˜ fm,n − υ fm,n
}
, (56a)
s.t. :
∑
m∈Mf
∑
n∈N
pfm,n ≤ pfmax ∀f ∈ F , (56b)
pfm,n ≥ 0, ∀m ∈Mf , n ∈ N , m ∈Mf , (56c)
pfm,np
f
i,nQˆ
f
m,i,n ≤ 0, ∀f ∈ F , (56d)
n ∈ N ,m, i ∈Mf , |hfi,n|2 ≤ |hfm,n|2, i 6= m,
− pfm,npfi,nψˆ fm,i,n,e ≤ 0, ∀f ∈ F , n ∈ N , (56e)
m, i ∈Mf , e ∈ E, |hfi,n|2 ≤ |hfe,n|2,
log(
∣∣∣hfe,n∣∣∣2 ∑
i∈Mf /{m}
pfi,n + Iˆ fm,n + σ 2 + pfm,n
∣∣∣hfe,n∣∣∣2)
− log(
∣∣∣hfe,n∣∣∣2 ∑
i∈Mf /{m}
pfi,n + Iˆ fm,n + σ 2)
−υ fm,n≤0, ∀e∈E, n∈N , f ∈F , ∀m∈Mf ,
(56f)
pfm,n × . . .× pfi,n × pfw,n︸ ︷︷ ︸
`+1
≤ 0, ∀n ∈ N , f ∈ F
(56g)
m, . . . , i, w ∈Mf , m 6= . . . 6= i 6= w.
where
Qˆfm,i,n = −|hfm,n|2σ 2 + |hfi,n|2σ 2 + |hfi,n|2 Iˆ fm,n
− |hfm,n|2 Iˆ fi,n −
∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2 ∑∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2≤∣∣∣hfl,n∣∣∣2
l∈Mf /{i}
pfl,n
+
∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2 ∑∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2≤∣∣∣hfl,n∣∣∣2
l∈Mf /{i}
pfl,n, (57)
and
ψˆ
f
m,i,n,e = −|hfe,n|2σ 2 + |hfi,n|2σ 2 − |hfe,n|2 Iˆ fi,n + |hfi,n|2 Iˆ fe,n
−
∣∣∣hfe,n∣∣∣2∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2 ∑∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2≤∣∣∣hfl,n∣∣∣2
l∈Mf /{i}
pfl,n
+
∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2∣∣∣hfe,n∣∣∣2 ∑
l∈Mf /{i}
pfl,n, (58)
where Iˆ fm,n = ∑
f ′∈F/f
∣∣∣hf ′m,n∣∣∣2 ∑
i∈Mf ′
pf ′i,n and Iˆ
f
e,n =
∑
f ′∈F/f
∣∣∣hf ′e,n∣∣∣2 ∑
i∈Mf ′
pf ′i,n. Moreover, r˜
f
m,n is
defined as:
r˜ fm,n = log

1+
pfm,n
∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2 ∑∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2≤∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2
i∈Mf /{m}
pfi,n + Iˆ fm,n + σ 2

,
(59)
B. MONOTONIC OPTIMIZATION
In the second step, our aim is to formulate the optimiza-
tion problem (56) as a monotonic optimization problem in
the canonical form. As we know, the optimization prob-
lem (56) is a non-monotonic problem because the objective
function is not increasing function and constraints (56d),
(56e), and (56f) are not inside normal or conormal sets.
Since the optimization problem is a problem with hidden
monotonicity [34], we can rewrite the objective function
and non-monotonic constraints to a differences of increas-
ing function form. Hence, let us reformulate the objective
function as r˜ fm,n − υ fm,n = gf+m,n − gf−m,n where gf+m,n =
log

∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2 ∑∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2≤∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2
i∈Mf /{m}
pfi,n+ Iˆ fm,n+σ 2+pfm,n
∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2
 and
gf−m,n = log

∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2 ∑∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2≤∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2
i∈Mf /{m}
pfi,n + Iˆ fm,n + σ 2
+ υ fm,n.
We introduce auxiliary variables T1, T2, T3, T4, and T5 to
reformulate (56) as [54], [55]:
max
P,υ,T1,T2,T3,T4,T5
∑
∀f ∈F
∑
∀m∈Mf
∑
∀n∈N
{
gf+m,n + T f4,m,n
}
,
(60a)
s.t. : (56b), (56c), (56g), (60b)
O+ (P)+ T f1,m,i,n ≤ O+
(
Pmask
)
, ∀f ∈ F ,
(60c)
n ∈ N , m, i ∈Mf , |hfi,n|2 ≤ |hfm,n|2, i 6= m,
O− (P)+ T f1,m,i,n ≥ O+
(
Pmask
)
, ∀f ∈ F ,
(60d)
n ∈ N , m, i ∈Mf , |hfi,n|2 ≤ |hfm,n|2, i 6= m,
0 ≤ T f1,m,i,n ≤ O+
(
Pmask
)
− O+ (0), ∀f ∈ F ,
(60e)
n ∈ N , m, i ∈Mf , |hfi,n|2 ≤ |hfm,n|2, i 6= m,
Oˆ+ (P)+ T f2,m,i,n,e ≤ Oˆ+
(
Pmask
)
, ∀f ∈ F ,
(60f)
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n ∈ N , m, i ∈Mf , e ∈ E, |hfi,n|2 ≤ |hfe,n|2,
Oˆ− (P)+ T f2,m,i,n,e ≥ Oˆ+
(
Pmask
)
, ∀f ∈ F ,
(60g)
n ∈ N , m, i ∈Mf , e ∈ E, |hfi,n|2 ≤ |hfe,n|2,
0 ≤ T f2,m,i,n,e ≤ Oˆ+
(
Pmask
)
− Oˆ+ (0), ∀f ∈ F ,
(60h)
n ∈ N , m, i ∈Mf , e ∈ E, |hfi,n|2 ≤ |hfe,n|2,
O˜+ (P)+ T f3,m,n,e ≤ O˜+
(
Pmask
)
, ∀e ∈ E,
(60i)
n ∈ N , f ∈ F , m ∈Mf ,
O˜− (P)+ T f3,m,n,e ≥ O˜+
(
Pmask
)
, ∀e ∈ E,
(60j)
n ∈ N , f ∈ F , m ∈Mf ,
0 ≤ T f3,m,n,e ≤ O˜+
(
Pmask
)
− O˜+ (0), ∀e ∈ E,
(60k)
n ∈ N , f ∈ F , m ∈Mf ,
T f4,m,n + gf−m,n (P) ≤ gf−m,n
(
Pmask
)
(60l)
0 ≤ T f4,m,n ≤ gf−m,n
(
Pmask
)
− gf−m,n (0) (60m)
gf−m,n (P)+ T f5,m,n ≤ gf−m,n
(
Pmask
)
, ∀n ∈ N ,
(60n)
f ∈ F ,m ∈Mf ,
gf+m,n (P)+ T f5,m,n ≥ gf−m,n
(
Pmask
)
, ∀n ∈ N ,
(60o)
f ∈ F ,∀m ∈Mf ,
0 ≤ T f5,m,n ≤ gf−m,n
(
Pmask
)
− gf−m,n (0), ∀n ∈ N ,
(60p)
f ∈ F , m ∈Mf ,
where, Pmask is a vector which is defined as Pmask =[
pf ,maskm,n
]
,∀m ∈ Mf , n ∈ N , f ∈ F , where pf ,maskm,n is the
transmit power spectral mask for user m on the nth subcar-
rier, which is served by the f th BS. Moreover, O+ (P) =
pfm,np
f
i,n(|hfi,n|2σ 2+
∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2 ∑∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2≤∣∣∣hfl,n∣∣∣2
l∈Mf /{i}
pfl,n+ hfi,nIˆ fm,n),
O− (P) = pfm,npfi,n(|hfm,n|2σ 2 + hfm,n Iˆ fi,n +
∣∣∣hfm,n∣∣∣2∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2∑
∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2≤∣∣∣hfl,n∣∣∣2
l∈Mf /{i}
pfl,n), Oˆ
+ (P) = pfm,npfi,n(|hfe,n|2σ 2 + hfe,n Iˆ fi,n +
∣∣∣hfe,n∣∣∣2∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2 ∑∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2≤∣∣∣hfl,n∣∣∣2
l∈Mf /{i}
pfl,n), Oˆ
− (P) = pfm,npfi,n(|hfi,n|2σ 2 +
hfi,nIˆ
f
e,n +
∣∣∣hfi,n∣∣∣2∣∣∣hfe,n∣∣∣2 ∑
l∈Mf /{i}
pfl,n, ), O˜
+ (P) = log(
∣∣∣hfe,n∣∣∣2
∑
i∈Mf /{m}
pfi,n + Iˆ fe,n + σ 2 + pfm,n
∣∣∣hfe,n∣∣∣2), and O˜− (P) =
log(
∣∣∣hfe,n∣∣∣2 ∑
i∈Mf /{m}
pfi,n + Iˆ fe,n + σ 2) + υ fm,n. According to
problem (60), we define two sets as follows:
ℵ1 =
{
(P,υ,T1,T2,T3,T4,T5) : P  Pmask, (56b), (56g),
× (60c), (60f), (60i), (60l), (60n)
}
, (61)
and
ℵ2 = {(P,υ,T1,T2,T3,T4,T5) : P  0, (56c), (60d),
(60g), (60j), (60m), (60o)}, (62)
in fact, the intersection of sets ℵ1 and ℵ2 is the feasi-
ble set of problem (60), moreover, ℵ1 and ℵ2 are normal
and co-normal sets, respectively, in the following hyper-
rectangle, [54], [55]:[
0,Pmask
]
×
[
0,O+
(
Pmask
)
− O+ (0)
]
×
[
0, Oˆ+
(
Pmask
)
− Oˆ+ (0)
]
×
[
0, O˜+
(
Pmask
)
− O˜+ (0)
]
×
[
0, gf−m,n
(
Pmask
)
− gf−m,n (0)
]
× [0,υmax] . (63)
finally, problem (60) is a monotonic problem in a canonical
form, based on Definition 5 in [55]. Hence, the optimization
problem (60) can be solved by using the polyblock algorithm.
As mentioned way, at which we convert (17) to a canonical
form of monotonic optimization, we can convert (53) to a
canonical form.
C. COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY
In this section we discuss about the computational complex-
ity of the polyblock algorithm. As we know, the computa-
tional complexity of this algorithm depends on the number
of variables and form of the functions in the optimization
problem. In the polyplock algorithm four main steps are
performed. In the first step, the best vertex should be found,
in the second step we find projection of the selected vertex,
improper vertexes are removed in the third step, and new
vertex set is found in the fourth step. The dimension of
our optimization problem is =0 = F + NF (3M + 1) +
(M − 1) (M (M − 2)+ 3NFM+ 3NFME) +3FNME), the
convergence of algorithm for stopping threshold 10−3, occurs
approximately after =1 = 104 iterations, the bisection
algorithm which gives projection of vertex, with stop-
ping threshold 10−3, has =2 = 103 iterations, approx-
imately. Hence, the complexity order can be written as
O (=1 (=1 × =0 + =2)), [12].
In order to present a comprehensive comparison between
the optimal solution (monotonic) and the suboptimal solu-
tion (the proposed solution), we provided Table 2. As men-
tioned, in the optimal solution, first we convert the opti-
mization problems to the canonical form of monotonic
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γ fm,n =
pfm,n
∥∥∥hfm,nwf †m,n∥∥∥2
I fm,n + ∑∥∥∥hfm,n∥∥∥2 ≤ ∥∥∥hfi,n∥∥∥2
×i ∈Mf / {m}
∥∥∥hfm,nwf †i,n∥∥∥2pfi,nρfi,n + σ 2 , (66)
optimization problem and finally, we solve them by employ-
ing the Polyblock algorithm. However, in the suboptimal
solution, first convert the optimization problems to two sub-
problems, power and subcarrier allocation, and solve them
separately, and finally, we solve the power allocation with
the successive convex approximation method and subcarrier
allocation with the mesh adaptive direct search algorithm.
Furthermore, the performance of the optimal solution with
respect to the suboptimal solution is approximately 13.05%
while its complexity with respect to the suboptimal solution is
approximately 1.3772× 104 times. This illustrates which the
complexity of optimal solution is highly significant compared
to the performance increase. Note that, the global optimal
solution is only considered as a benchmark for the optimality
gap analysis.
VII. MULTIPLE ANTENNAS BSS SCENARIO
In this section, our aim is to evaluate SIC avoidance when
the BSs are equipped with KT antennas. BS f transmits
Mf∑
j=1
√
pfj,nρ
f
j,nw
f
j,ns
f
j,n on subcarrier n, where w
f
m,n is precoding
vector, wfm,n ∈ CKT×1. The received signals on the mth user
and the eth adversary, that are located in the coverage region
of BS f , on the nth subcarrier are expressed as
yfm,n =
∑
i∈Mf
√
pfi,nρ
f
i,nh
f †
m,nw
f
i,ns
f
i,n (64)
+
∑
f ′∈F/f
∑
i∈Mf ′
√
pf ′i,nρ
f ′
i,nh
f ′†
m,nw
f ′
i,ns
f ′
i,n + Z fm,n,
yfe,n =
∑
i∈Mf
pfi,nρ
f
i,nh
f †
e,nw
f
i,ns
f
i,n (65)
+
∑
f ′∈F/f
∑
i∈Mf ′
pf ′i,nρ
f ′
i,nh
f ′†
e,nw
f ′
i,ns
f ′
i,n + Z fe,n,
respectively. where † is the hermitian operator and hfm,n ∈
CKT×1. We assume the BSs employ Maximum Ratio Trans-
mission technique (MRT), hence, wfm,n = hfm,n/
∥∥∥hfm,n∥∥∥.
When user m applies SIC, its SINR in BS f on subcarrier
n can be expressed as (66), as shown at the top of this page,
where I fm,n = ∑
f ′∈F/f
∑
i∈Mf ′
pf ′i,nρ
f ′
i,n
∥∥∥hf ′m,nwf ′†i,n∥∥∥2. SINR of the
eavesdropper e in BS f on subcarrier n can be obtained as:
γ f ,me,n =
pfm,n
∥∥∥hfe,nwf †m,n∥∥∥2∑
i∈Mf /{m}
∥∥∥hfe,nwf †i,n∥∥∥2pfi,nρfi,n + I fe,n + σ 2 , (67)
where I fe,n = ∑
f ′∈F/f
∑
i∈Mf ′
pf ′i,nρ
f ′
i,n
∥∥∥hf ′e,nwf ′†i,n∥∥∥2. The optimiza-
tion problem can be written as follows:
max
P,ρ
∑
∀f ∈F
∑
∀m∈Mf
∑
∀n∈N
ρfm,n
{
r fm,n − r f ,memax,n
}
, (68a)
s.t. : C1 : (13b), (13c), (14), (14)
C2 : ρfm,nρfi,nQfm,i,n(ρ,P) ≤ 0, ∀f ∈ F ,
n∈N , m, i∈Mf ,
∥∥∥hfi,n∥∥∥2≤∥∥∥hfm,n∥∥∥2 , i 6=m,
(68b)
C3 : ρfm,nρfi,nψ fm,i,n,e(ρ,P)≥0, ∀f ∈F , n∈N ,
m, i ∈Mf , e ∈ E,
∥∥∥hfi,n∥∥∥2 ≤ ∥∥∥hfe,n∥∥∥2 , (68c)
C4 : r fm,n−r f ,memax,n≥0, ∀m∈Mf , n∈N , f ∈F ,
(68d)
whereQfm,i,n andψ
f
m,i,n can be obtained similar to inequalities
(5) and (9), respectively. In order to solve the optimization
problem (68), we employ an iteration algorithm similar to
SISO scenario, i.e., Algorithm 1.
VIII. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we provide numerical results to evaluate the
performance of the proposed scheme. The simulation param-
eters are considered as: pmax0 = 16 dB (maximum allowable
transmit power of MBS), pmaxm = 6 dB, ∀m ∈ M/ {1}
(maximum allowable transmit power of SBS), Power Spectral
Density (PSD) of noise is −130 dBm/Hz, α = 4. Maximum
coverage MBS and SBS are supposed 1500 m and 15 m,
respectively.
At the first glance, it may seem that condition (9) can not be
satisfied through the proposed resource allocation algorithm.
Hence, we plot Fig. 2 which illustrates the outage probability
of condition (9) versus the number of subcarriers to show
condition (9) are satisfied through the proposed resource allo-
cation algorithm. Condition (9) can be in outage if it cannot
be satisfied with optimal optimization variables. As seen in
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TABLE 2. The comparison of the optimal and suboptimal solutions.
FIGURE 2. The outage probability of condition (9) versus the number of
subcarriers.
FIGURE 3. Secrecy sum rate versus the number of subcarriers,
comparison between the proposed scheme (SIC avoidance at the
eavesdroppers) and when the eavesdropper can do SIC, M = 3 per km2,
E = 2 per km2, F = 2 per km2, and Mt = 8.
this figure, by increasing the number of subcarriers the outage
probability of condition (9) decreases.
In Fig. 3, the sum secrecy rate versus the number of sub-
carriers is shown. Also this figure compares our proposed
FIGURE 4. Secrecy sum rate versus the number of subcarriers for perfect
and imperfect CSI in the proposed scheme, F = 2 per km2, M = 3 per
km2, E = 2 per km2.
scheme at which the eavesdroppers are not able to perform
SICwith the case they can perform SIC. As seen in this figure,
the sum secrecy rate in our proposed scheme has 72% gap
with the conventional type, because in the proposed scheme
we do not allow eavesdroppers to perform SIC, even if they
know the channel ordering, but in the conventional type the
eavesdroppers can perform SIC. Moreover, this figure com-
pares single and multiple antennas Bss scenarios and shows
when the BSs are equippedwithmultiple antennas the secrecy
rate increases.
In Fig. 4, we compare the performance of the proposed
scheme for the perfect and imperfect CSI scenarios. More-
over, this figure shows imperfect CSI sensitivity with respect
to the upper bound of error. As seen, when  = e = m =
0.1, the imperfect SCI scenario has 20.7% gap with respect
to perfect CSI. By increasing  to 0.3 and 0.5, this gap is
increased to 26.14% and 44.53%, respectively.
Fig. 5, shows the sum secrecy rate versus the number
of eavesdroppers. As seen, with increasing the number of
eavesdroppers in our system model, the sum secrecy rate is
decreased. This is because, as we know, it is assumed the
eavesdroppers are non-clutsions, therefore, when an eaves-
107892 VOLUME 7, 2019
M. Forouzesh et al.: Robust Physical Layer Security for PD-NOMA-Based HetNets and HUDNs: SIC Avoidance at Eavesdroppers
FIGURE 5. Secrecy sum rate versus the number of eavesdroppers, in the
proposed scheme, F = 2 per km2, N = 4, E = 2 per km2.
FIGURE 6. Convergence of the proposed algorithm.
dropper is added to the system, its channel maybe better than
others, hence the secrecy rate changes (decreases). In the
simulation, we use the Monte Carlo method, therefore when
the number of eavesdroppers is increased, the secrecy rate
decreases on average.
Fig. 6 presents the convergence behavior of the proposed
algorithm. We observe that the algorithm converges in iter-
ation 8, in ASM, approximately. In this figure, we assume
E = 2 per km2, F = 2 per km2,M = 3 per km2, and N = 2.
In addition, we show optimal solution in all of these
figures. As seen, the proposed suboptimal solution which
has low complexity with respect to the monotonic optimiza-
tion problem, is closed to the optimal solution, for example
in Fig. 5, the optimal solution has approximately 13.05% gap
with the proposed suboptimal solution.
As mentioned in Section V, for evaluating the performance
degradation due to the uniform power allocation, we compare
the uniform power allocation method for a small network
dimension with our proposed solution i.e., joint power and
subcarrier allocation in Fig. 7. As shown in this figure, there is
approximately 9% performance gap between these methods.
FIGURE 7. Comparison between our proposed solution and the uniform
power allocation method, M = 3 per km2, F = 2 per km2.
FIGURE 8. Secrecy sum rate versus the number of BSs in HUDN, N = 48,
M = 300 per km2.
FIGURE 9. Typical user’s service outage probability versus the number of
subcarriers.
In Fig. 8, sum secrecy rate versus the number of BSs
in HUDN for massive connectivity is evaluated. Besides,
this figure investigates effect of number of eavesdroppers in
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massive connectivity. As seen, by increasing one BS per Km2,
the sum secrecy rate 2.5 unit increases, approximately.
Fig. 9 illustrates the typical user’s service outage proba-
bility versus the number of subcarriers in two cases 1) SIC
avoidance at eavesdroppers (the proposed scheme), 2) with-
out considering SIC avoidance at eavesdroppers (conven-
tional scheme). The typical user’s service can be in outage
if the constraints related to the typical user is satisfied with
ρ = 0 which leads to that the typical user’s secrecy rate is 0.
As seen in this figure, by increasing the number of subcarriers
the typical user’s service outage probability decreases. It is
necessary to mention that although service outage probability
in the case of ‘‘without considering SIC avoidance at eaves-
droppers’’ is less than case of ‘‘SIC avoidance at eavesdrop-
pers’’, as seen in Fig. 3, the ergodic sum secrecy rate in our
proposed scheme has 72% gap with the conventional type.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated PLS for power domain
non-orthogonal multiple access based HetNet. We proposed
a novel resource allocation to maximize the sum secrecy
rate in PD-NOMA based HetNet. In the proposed scenario,
the eavesdroppers are not allowed to perform successive
interference cancellation, but the legitimate users are able
to perform it. Hence, all users’ signals in the eavesdroppers
are treated as interference, while some users’ signals can
be canceled in the desired users, therefore, less interference
is experienced by users. In order to solve the optimization
problem, we adopted the iterative algorithm called ASM,
i.e., to convert the optimization problems to two subprob-
lems power and subcarrier allocation and solve them alter-
natively. In each iteration of ASM, we consider fixed sub-
carrier and allocated power, then, for subcarrier allocation
we consider fixed power. In each iteration of this method,
power allocation problem, is non-convex and subcarrier allo-
cation is NLP. Hence, we solve the power allocation by the
SCA approach. To this end, we use the DC approximation,
to transform the non-convex problem into canonical form of
convex optimization. Also, we solve subcarrier allocation,
by exploiting MADS, hence we employ the existing solver
called NOMAD.Moreover, we obtained optimal solution and
the optimality gap of the proposed solution method, by con-
verting the optimization problems to a canonical form of
the monotonic optimization problem and exploiting the poly-
block algorithm. Besides, we evaluated the proposed scheme
for secure massive connectivity in mMTC cases in HUDNs.
As resource allocation in this networks has high dimension
complexity, we allocated the transmit power uniformly to
users and showed the performance of uniform power allo-
cation is close to the performance of our proposed solution.
Furthermore, we investigated multiple antennas base stations
scenario in this literature. Numerical results show the sum
secrecy rate in our novel resource allocation has 72%gapwith
the conventional type at which the eavesdroppers are able
to perform SIC. Moreover, we investigated imperfect CSI of
the eavesdroppers scenario and compared it with the perfect
CSI case. It is necessary to mention that we investigate and
analyze to find a low complex and optimal solution for the
proposed optimization problem as future work.
APPENDIX
In the SCA approach with the DC approximation, a sequence
of improved feasible solutions is generated and is converged
to a local optimum, [47].
Proof: As mentioned, we approximate (37) with func-
tion (38). Gradient of function H fm,n (P) is its super gradient,
because H fm,n (P) is a concave function [53]
. Hence, we have
H fm,n (P (µ)) ≤ H fm,n (P (µ− 1))
+∇TH fm,n (P (µ− 1)) (P (µ)− P(µ− 1)),
(69)
Therefore, in the objective function, we have:∑
∀f ∈F
∑
∀m∈Mf
∑
∀n∈Nf
ρfm,n
{
Gfm,n (P (µ))− H fm,n (P (µ))
}
≥
∑
∀f ∈F
∑
∀m∈Mf
∑
∀n∈Nf
ρfm,n
{
Gfm,n (P (µ))− H fm,n (P (µ− 1))
−∇TH fm,n (P (µ− 1)) (P (µ)− P(µ− 1))
}
= max
P
∑
∀f ∈F
∑
∀m∈Mf
∑
∀n∈Nf
ρfm,n
{
Gfm,n (P)
−H fm,n (P (µ−1))−∇TH fm,n (P (µ−1)) (P−P(µ−1))
}
≥
∑
∀f ∈F
∑
∀m∈Mf
∑
∀n∈Nf
ρfm,n
{
Gfm,n (P(µ− 1))
−H fm,n (P (µ− 1))−∇TH fm,n (P (µ− 1))
× (P(µ− 1)− P(µ− 1))}
=
∑
∀f ∈F
∑
∀m∈Mf
∑
∀n∈Nf
ρfm,n
×
{
Gfm,n (P (µ− 1))− H fm,n (P (µ− 1))
}
.
Therefore, after iteration µ, the objective function value
either increases or stays unchanged with respect to iteration
µ− 1.
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